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China: A Visitor's Report
Duringthe last four years, Itwice visited China.
The first time was in the Summerof1980, and the
second, last Fall. Between thetwo visits, China
undertooksomedramaticbasic economicreforms.
In this Letter, I present my impressions ofthe
changes I witnessed and discuss the problems still
confronting China's economy.
Modernization, 1980
The 1980 visittook place shortly after China
launched its "Modernization" program. As
reported in the Letter ofOctober24, 1980, China
completelytransformed itselffrom aprivateenter-
prise to a socialist-planned economy afterthe
1949 Revolution. By 1958, private enterprise had
been completelyeliminated in the industrial and
commercial sectors, and agriculture was either
nationalized orcollectivized. The twenty years
thatfollowed were marked byturmoiI and cala-
mity as the nation suffered through the "Great
Leap Forward" in the late 1950s and, afterfour
years ofrecovery, the Cultural Revolution of
1966-76.Chinaemerged from the late 1970swith
outdated technology, lowworker morale, a stag-
nanteconomyinsulated from the restoftheworld,
and a greatly swollen population.
After Chairman Mao's death in 1976, the new
leadershipmadea landmarkdecision in December
1978to begin ashiftfrom the completelycollecti-
vized, egalitarian, Soviet-type command economy
toward an economy in which the market mecha-
nism would be allowed to playa large role in
allocating resources within a socialist framework.
From the start, the reformers realizedtheenormity
oftheirtask. Instead offollowing a preconceived
blueprint,theyadopted apragmatic, experimental
approach toward reaching the ultimategoals of
economicreform. Nevertheless, thegeneral direc-
tion ofthe reform was clear. First, they resolutely
turned away from a preoccupation with capital
investmenttowards agreater emphasis on meeting
consumer needs. Second, the reformers decided
to removestifling, directbureaucraticcontrol over
economic activities togive enterprises greater
autonomy. Third, they emphasized openingthe
economy to foreign trade and foreign investment.
The task was gargantuan and the obstacles to
reform were numerous. History is notreplete with
cases ofhuge, clumsy bureaucracies rejuvenating
themselves by relinquishing tight controls on a
national economy. China's case was madeeven
more difficultby adecade ofself-destruction
duringthe Cultural Revolution, when all schools
were shut down and a whole generation lostthe
opportunity foreducation. Ideology superseded
technical expertise, and slogans substituted for
knowledge. Although impressed bythe reformers'
obvious determination and fervor, I nevertheless
felt thatthe prospects for the reform's success
were bleak.
Observations, 1984
It was thus with considerable surprise that I found
on the 1984 return trip a newdynamism and
confidence in the country's future. There was per-
vasiveevidence, absentfouryears ago, ofanation
onthevergeof"economictake-off." In Beijing, in
particular, many modern highrises had altered the
city's skyline. People were better dressed in a
widervarietyofcolorsand styles. Wherethere had
been sparsely stocked storesin 1980, there was
now an abundance ofmeats, vegetables, fruits,
and consumer goods. Streets still crowded with
bicycles were now also clogged duringpeak r~sh
hourswith automoilesand trucks, manyimported.
Moreover, the qualityofcity living as represented
by its cleanlinessand attractiveness seemed greatly
improved. In Beijing, manytrees, shrubs and lawns
nowfront apartment houses where four years ago
there was only bare ground.
Even more impressive were the improvements in
the rural areas, where eighty percent ofthe pop-
ulation reside. On visits to the countryside, one
could nothelp noticingthe handsome two-story
houses that the farmers had themselves buiIt
duringthe last twoorthree years. There were
clearly more consumer goods available in the
rural area as well, as evidenced bythe large
numberofbicycles, radios, and even television
sets in farm households. Particularly interesting
werethe manysmall tractorsdriven byfarmers on
rural roads; these tractors plowed the fields but
also served as a means of rural transportation.FRBSF
Governmentofficials invariably attributed this
dramatic improvement in rural livingconditions
to the recently introduced "household responsi-
biIity" policy. This policydistributed landtofarm-
ers through long-term leases accordingto the
numberofpersons in each farm household. In
return, a household mustturn a fixed amountof
produce(set byanegotiated contractbetween the
farmer and the authorities) overto the state, but
can keep any surplus for its own consumption or
for sale in the open market. In effect, this policy
represents a dramatic land reform that has largely
reversed the earlier collectivist policy. It has re-
placed the nationwide agricultural communes
and collectives with a land-tenure system similar
to sharecropping-exceptthat the farmers are
obligated to turn in a fixed amount, rather than a
fixed percentage, oftheir annual produce. The
fixed amount provides a great incentive for a
farmerto increase production to earn the surplus.
The new land-tenure system plus the high official
purchase prices offarm products have combined
tofuel a surge ofproductiveeffortand creativity in
the farm sector. In many regions, the authorities
had stopped buyinggrains from farmers because
they had run shortofstorage space. Iwas repeat-
edly told thatthere are now many "10,000-yuan
households," meaningthatthere were now many
households with annual incomes exceeding
10,000 yuan (about $4,000) in rural areas all over
the country. This income compares well to the
annual incomeofabout4,000 yuan fora cabinet
minister, 1,000yuan foraschool teacher, and 700
yuan for a factory laborer. These 10,000-yuan
households have madetheirfortunes notonly
through agriculturebutalso byraising pigs, chick-
ens and ducks, by stocking fish ponds, and by
selling handicrafts.
Theauthoritiesare makingashowcaseofall those
who have become wealthy through innovative
individual entrepreneurship, although there is evi-
dence thatthe agricultural reforms had other pur-
poses as well. For example, they also seem aimed
at reducing the pressures on urban development.
The historical imbalance between farm incomes
and those ofurban occupations has encouraged a
strong trend ofmigrationfrom farms to cities.
The apparent success ofrural economic reform
has led Chineseofficialstoextend the principlesof
the household responsibility policyto urban in-
dustrial and commercial enterprises. In October
1984, the Party's Central Committee adopted a
plan intended to subject city enterprises to the
discipline ofthe market, lettingthem prosper or
fail according to their success in meeting market
demand. To many, the decision means the start of
Phase Twoofthe "Second Socialist Revolution"
launched six years ago.
Remaining challenges
The 1984 visit leftIittledoubtthatthegreatmajor-
ity ofthe people, especially those in the country-
side, are living much better today than they did a
mere four years ago. The removal ofrigid controls
over economic activities has led to a veritable
explosion ofcreative energy. The subsequent im-
provement in livingconditions and adroit man-
agementof resources have been impressive and
even startling in viewofthe short time that has
elapsed.
Yet, to applaud the progress is notto say that
China's Modernization is no longerfraught with
difficultunresolved problems. Perhaps thebiggest
problem today is reform ofthe domestic price
structure which is seriouslyoutof linewith the
relative costs ofproduction and world prices.
Withouta reasonable pricing system, itmakes
little sense totalk about letting market incentives
help directthe allocation of resources. The prob-
lem was obvious to Chinese policymakers four
years ago, but the price structure remains rigid.
Thus far, no majorprice adjustments have been
made although officials are acutely aware ofthe
obviousunder-pricingofcoal, staplefoods, public
transportation, and housing. Reportedly, subsidies
on these goodsand services accountformorethan
one-halfofthe central government's budget
expenditures. Such long inaction testifies tothe
enormous political risk involved in making basic
changes in the price structure.
The problem ofa rigid domestic price structure
has also exacerbated China's difficulty in formu-
latingasensibleexchangerate policy. Since 1981,
Chinahas had what is generally regarded as adual
exchange rate system. Underthis system, tourist
expenditures, inward remittances, and foreign
diplomatic spending have all been conducted at
the official rate -which upto about nine months
ago, was stable at around 2 yuans per U.S. dollar
-whileall importand exporttransactions be-
tweenthestatetradingcorporationsand domestic
residents havebeen at afixed "internal settlement
rate" of2.8 yuans per dollar.This dual exchange rate system has caused much
confusion and misunderstanding. U.S. industries,
for example, have demanded countervailing du-
ties against textile imports from China, alleging
that the differential between the Chinese internal
settlement rate and the officialrateconstitutes an
export subsidy. The system also has been respon-
sible for extensive black market activities that
have caused the governmentto lose foreign
exchange receipts. Partly in responsetothese con-
cerns, the authorities have allowed the official
exchange rate tofloatgraduallyupwardduringthe
past nine months; itreached a high of2.62 yuans
duringthe author's visit.
Another major problem facing China's Modern-
ization program is the country's ponderous bu-
reaucracy. Despite the reforms that have been
implemented, the bureaucracy continues to make
all majoreconomic decisions and to dominate all
large enterprises. Government industrial bureaus
have been renamed corporationswith newplaques
decoratingtheir front doors and former bureau
heads are now called presidents. However, with
noreal system ofinternal responsibilityorexternal
discipline imposed by market competition, the
newly formed corporations still operate like the
old bureaucracies.
Combined with the effects ofunchanged prices,
which place essential inputs (such as raw
materials, fuel, transportation, and finance) in
perpetually short supply, a large partofChinese
entrepreneurship consists ofacquiring and using
the political clout needed to secure scarce but
essential supplies. For instance, because ofthe
acute shortage oftransportation equipment, a
license to import atruck was said to be worth at
least as much as its importprice. Withoutan open
bidding system, the import licensing authorities
obviously hold a great deal ofeconomic power.
A similar situation exists in the labor market.
Because wages too are frozen, managers, techni-
ciansand skilled workerswhoare highlyvalued in
their places ofemployment are rarely granted the
permission to leave in search ofhigherwages. The
reduced labor mobility limits productivity. In short,
bureaucracy continues to hold sway overa large
partofChina's economic lifedespite the progress
wrought by very significanteconomic reforms.
Conclusion
NovisitortoChinatodaycan helpbutbe impressed
bythe prevailing spiritofenterprise and confi-
dence. Surprisingly large progress has been made
in livingconditions inthe lastfouryears. Whilethe
progress has bolstered hope for continued im-
provements, there is reason to believe that serious
obstacles still lie ahead. Basically, the reformers
haveyettodecideon theextenttowhichtheywiII
yield directadministrative control to the workings
ofthe marketsystem. Inotherwords, they have yet
tosettle on an appropriate mixofmarketprinciples
within a socialisteconomy.
The Chinese economic reform is undoubtedlythe
world's largest controlled economicexperiment
ofthis century, involvingone-quarter ofthe human
race. It is like turning a gigantic ship around, with
onebiIIion passengers aboard, in largelyuncharted
waters. The world holds its breath in watching the
maneuver. Although the direction of reform has
been spelled out in the October 1984 declaration
ofthe Party's Central Committee, the truetest still
lies ahead-in its implementation.
Hang-ShengCheng
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 189,644 - 63 13,619 7.5
Loans and Leases1 6 171,304 - 51 15,949 10.0
Commercial and Industrial 53,136 - 250 7,173 15.3
Real estate 61,972 - 67 3,073 5.1
Loans to Individuals 32,259 259 5,608 20.6
Leases 5,118 39 55 1.0
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,198 - 67 - 1,309 - 10.2
Other Securities2 7,142 55 - 1,021 - 12.2
Total Deposits 200,606 5,144 9,609 4.9
Demand Deposits 51,178 4,289 1,941 3.8
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 33,178 1,477 1,847 5.7
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,317 683 542 4.1
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,112 173 7,127 5.4
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts'---Total 42,051 627 2,454 6.0
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000 or more 40,299 - 918 2,134 5.4
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 21,685 936 - 1,322 - 5.6
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephonetransfers
5 Includes borroWing via FRB, IT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change